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Do Laws Influence the Cost of Real Estate Brokerage Services? 
A State Fixed Effects Approach 
Anupam Nanda*, John M. Clapp**, Katherine A. Pancak*** 
 
The FTC-DOJ (2007) study argues that state laws and regulations may inhibit the unbundling of real estate 
brokerage services in response to new technology. Our data show that eighteen states have changed laws in ways that 
promote unbundling since 2000. We model brokerage costs as measured by number of agents in a state-level annual 
panel vector auto-regressive (VAR) framework, a novel way of analyzing wasteful competition. Our findings support a 
positive relationship between brokerage costs and lagged house price and transactions. We find that change in full 
service brokers responds negatively (by well over 2 percentage points per year) to legal changes facilitating unbundling. 
 
A significant stream of research has focused on inefficient overproduction of real estate brokerage 
services (Yinger, 1981; Miceli, 1992; Yavas, 1992; Turnbull, 1996). New empirical findings support 
this idea. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) find that the productivity of real estate brokers as measured by 
houses sold per hour worked declines when the price of land increases in a city; they attribute this to 
overproduction of services (i.e., unnecessary increase in costs of selling a house) generated by 
relatively fixed commissions and entry of new brokers.1 In a more recent study of MSA-level 
variation, Han and Hong (2012, HH hereafter) find that a 10% increase in number of brokers will 
increase costs by 12.4%, and that more than one third of this effect can be attributed to wasteful 
non-price competition.  
 
* Henley Business School, University of Reading, UK or a.nanda@reading.ac.uk 
** Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies, School of Business, University of 
Connecticut, Storrs, CT  06269 or john.clapp@uconn.edu 
*** Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies, School of Business, University of 
Connecticut, Stamford, CT  06901 or katherine.pancak@uconn.edu 
                                                          
1 We use the term “brokers” to refer to licensed brokers and sales agents. 
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The primary purpose of this study is to ask whether the framework of laws and regulations 
governing real estate brokerage can significantly reduce costs by establishing an environment 
conducive to more efficient unbundling of brokerage services. If so, then the number of full service 
brokers should respond to house prices, transactions and law change as predicted by models of the 
inefficient over-production of brokerage services. Our research is motivated by regulatory changes 
on Wall Street in the 1970’s that allowed discount brokers to pass the benefits of new technology to 
customers. The result was a large increase in trading on stock markets.  
 
The literature points to two characteristics of the industry – low barriers to entry and inflexible 
commission rates – as the main factors driving inefficiency.2 The hypothesis of low entry barriers is 
generally accepted by industry observers, but the assertion of inflexible commission rates has been 
contested by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). However, Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz 
(2012) point to the natural monopoly aspect of the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), where brokers on 
both sides of the transaction share information and cooperate to complete a deal. Other studies 
point to MLS as the major reason that commission rates are high, attracting entry of more brokers 
than required to efficiently facilitate transactions (Yavas and Colwell, 1999; Woodall and Brobeck, 
2006). Even if the MLS is not the cause, evidence of relatively fixed commissions continues to 
garner support: see Barwick and Pathak (2015), Jia and Pathak (2010) and Wiley, Zumpano, and 
Benefield (2011).  
 
Improvements in technology – notably online listings with substantial visual and written information 
on properties and neighborhoods – should reduce the real economic costs of selling property by 
reducing the need for human time. Some brokers have used technology to unbundle the traditional 
                                                          
2 If entry is a function of reservation wage, as in Benjamin, Chinloy, and Winkler (2009), then a real increase in land 
value will cause entry, driving wages back to the reservation wage. 
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full package of brokerage services and offer real estate consumers the option of purchasing a limited 
level of services at reduced fees.3 Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magne (2009) found that sellers are 
unlikely to receive a significantly lower sales price if they use a limited service broker. Levitt and 
Syverson (2008) and Wiley, Zumpano, and Benefield (2011) concluded that residential real estate 
consumers using limited-service flat-fee brokers are not worse off than those using traditional full-
service, full-commission brokers.4 Rutherford and Yavas (2012) look at similar issues when using 
discount brokers in residential transactions. They find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at 
prices similar to non-discount brokerage listings, but with lower probability of sale and longer time 
on the market. 
 
This paper develops econometric models capable of evaluating the effect of public policy on the real 
economic costs of brokerage services in human time as measured by number of full service brokers 
(a term that we use to include sales agents as well) per unit service.5 Hsieh and Moretti (2003) 
measure productivity as properties sold per broker and HH measure cost as a function of total 
brokers per sale and number of sales. In a time series context, the stationary counterpart is change in 
number of brokers per unit service; services are measured by number of transactions or population 
                                                          
3 For example, Select A Fee Real Estate SystemTM lets a home seller choose a desired level of services for a fixed fee, not 
the traditional package of services for a percentage of the sales price. With their “Bare Bones Service” a seller can hire a 
listing broker to sell his or her house for only $350 plus 2.5% commission. For this price, the listing agent will place the 
property on a multiple listing service, and eventually help negotiate the contract, but the seller must show the home and 
hold open houses.  Flat Fee Listing advertises that it will enter into an arrangement with a seller to provide only entry to 
the local multiple listing services for $249, as a way to assist For Sale By Owner (FSBO). For these and other examples 
of offering unbundled limited services, see www.selectafee.com, www.flatfeelisting.com, www.listbyownerinmls.com, 
www.mlsmart.com, www.aflatfee.com, and www.valuemls.com (last accessed November,  2014). 
4 But for different reasons, Levitt and Syverson (2008) found that houses listed with limited service brokers take longer 
to sell but eventually sell at similar prices to those listed with full-service brokers. The authors  weighed the trade-off 
between the lower fees charged by a limited-service broker and the longer time on the market, and reasoned that 
consumers were not worse off than those using full-service brokers.  Wiley et al. (2011) found that limited service 
brokers do not increase a property’s time on the market, and that selling price is not significantly different than with full 
service brokers. 
5 Technology substitutes capital for labor, but it won’t be adopted unless this substitution is profit maximizing. Since 
labor is a large percent of the cost of brokerage services (Han and Hong, 2012; Benjamin et al., 2009), we should see a 
reduction in brokers per unit service when technology is adopted in the absence of barriers to efficiency. 
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(a measure of potential demand from all who might transact) or income.6 With change in brokers (or 
brokers per unit service) as a dependent variable, our model predicts that change in lagged house 
prices and transactions will be positively associated with number of brokers because of free entry or 
exit and fixed commissions. I.e., when house prices go up (down) then brokerage becomes more 
(less) profitable relative to other occupations, driving the number of brokers to change positively 
(negatively).  
 
We use NAR brokers are a proxy for the cost of full services because brokers are typically 60-70% 
of operating costs and because NAR policies cater to full service firms as indicated by a 2008 
settlement of a suit brought by the DOJ. This proxy ignores variation across brokers in expertise 
and experience so our results must be interpreted as average effects across all states for a typical 
broker. Since we do not observe hours worked, our results are conservative: i.e., a legal change will 
likely effect hours worked in the same direction as it influences number of full service brokers as 
suggested by Benjamin, Chinloy and Winkler (2009). 7   
 
Many changes to the institutional, regulatory and legal framework occur at the state level (hereafter, 
“state laws”). We propose a panel VAR model of brokerage costs using state-level data because it 
builds on the structural framework proposed by HH while allowing for considerable unobserved 
heterogeneity across US states. The VAR framework provides a robust method for determining the 
effect of statewide legal changes on brokerage costs while allowing endogeneity of all variables in the 
VAR system. 
                                                          
6 Typically, 60-70% of gross revenue to real estate brokerage is paid to agents for their services, so number of agents is a 
good proxy for costs. One source states that agents start “at 70 percent [of gross revenue] and bumps them up to 75 
percent when they gross $150,000; 80 percent for $250,000 and 90 percent for $500,000. “ 
http://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/splits-grow-more-crucial-as-market-tightens/ , last accessed in June, 2015. 
7 Further discussion of DOJ’s suit is contained in Section 3.1 and the omitted variables argument for hours worked is in 
Section 4.1. 
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In order to apply a state fixed effects model, we need to aggregate from local markets to the state 
level. Aggregation is a reasonable approximation for a study of brokerage costs for several reasons; 
most importantly, the economic cost of brokerage services exhibit little overall economies of scale 
(Anderson, Lewis, and Zumpano, 2000).8 Secondly, we study laws and regulations that apply equally 
throughout the state, so aggregation allows determination of the average statewide effect: constant 
costs as a function of firm size justifies our interpretation of regression parameters as average effects 
of legal changes on cost. Thirdly, we test our models for aggregation biases with limited MSA-level 
data. With derived information on number of brokers and transactions at the MSA level, we find 
that our main results are robust to MSA-level heterogeneity. 
 
We investigate changes in the legal (and regulatory) framework governing waivable minimum 
services and commission rebates. Moreover, non-agency (also known as transactions brokers or 
facilitators), like provisions allowing minimum services to be waived, reduce legal risk by removing 
liability for fiduciary duties. These three legal changes are chosen because they constitute the most 
important legal barriers to reaping benefits from adoption of technology: see a comprehensive 
report on these issues by the FTC-DOJ (2007).9 
New aspects of our study include: 
1. Where previous researchers used cross-sectional data, or changes between decennial census 
dates, we use annual time series on changes in full service brokers at the state level. 
                                                          
8 Zumpano, Elder and Crellin (1993) use translog production functions to model the cost structure. They show that very 
small firms operate inefficiently, but that average total costs are relatively constant for a broad range of firm sizes typical 
in the industry. Diseconomies of scale characterize the largest firms, but there is relatively little market concentration 
outside of the smallest cities (Beck et al., 2012).  
9 Our comprehensive review of legal changes during the period 2000-2012 (see Appendix tables A1 – A3) shows that 
nine states with minimum services laws made changes allowing them to be waived by agreement among the parties. 
Sixteen states had anti-rebate laws; seven rescinded. Three states changed to allow non-agency relationships during our 
sample period. Thus, our data show a trend towards legal changes that support unbundling of brokerage services. 
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2. Our reduced form VAR model provides a novel way of analyzing wasteful competition; it 
allows for dynamic co-dependence between numbers of full service brokers and house prices 
and other variables while placing minimal restrictions on the data.10 
3. By aggregating to the state level, we include non-metropolitan activity, a significant share at 
about 25 percent of the housing stock.  
4. As a robustness check we develop a method for imputing number of brokers and 
transactions at the MSA level, a method transferable to other statewide regulatory changes. 
For example, states have enacted consumer protection laws that address broker licensing, 
duties, and practices.11  
5. We control for time-invariant heterogeneity by differencing the data at the state level.  
6. We add dummies for changes in state law and regulation to the differenced VAR system, 
introducing a differences-in-differences (DID) procedure to control endogeneity and 
omitted variable bias. 
7. We further control for endogeneity of changes in state policy with two stage least squares 
and with dynamic panel methods (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
 
Panel VAR results confirm the findings of Hsieh and Moretti (2003) that change in full service 
brokers is positively related to change in house prices after controlling for the level of service, 
implying wasteful competition. The elasticity of brokers per unit service to house prices is positive in 
all models, with parameters greater than 0.12 in our preferred specifications. The predictions of the 
                                                          
10 While we cannot recover structural parameters from the panel VAR model, we can take another difference based on 
changes in state legal frameworks, and our interest centers on the effect of these changes. 
11 Changing provisions relating to real estate brokerage practices include duties to parties (escrowing of monies, 
submitting all offers, cooperating with other brokers), documents required to be given to consumers (agency disclosures, 
property condition disclosures), that a broker can represent a buyer (limiting the historical concept of sub-agency), 
whether a broker can represent both buyers and sellers in the same transaction (dual agency, designated agency), and 
whether a broker has to represent a consumer at all (non-agency transaction brokerage). 
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model are robust when the unit of service is specified as change in brokers per capita or as change in 
brokers per dollar income. 
 
Our approach complements HH, who use 2000 PUMS data for 160 free-standing MSAs. Once we 
recast their cost function in a panel VAR context, then changes in laws and regulations can be 
introduced as a second difference: the effect of the legal change is captured by the effect of a law 
dummy on the dependent variable, which is already a first difference at the state level. We show that 
change in full service brokers responds negatively when anti-rebate laws are rescinded, as predicted 
by HH. This result is robust to several alternative specifications, to various controls for endogeneity 
and to annual time dummies.12 
 
We find that the enactment of waivable minimum service and non-agency provisions reduced 
growth in full service brokers. I.e., our evidence suggests that laws allowing transactions facilitators 
or limited service brokers tended to clarify brokerage duties, reducing legal risk and encouraging 
unbundling of brokerage services. However, results are not robust to yearly time dummies; this is 
likely because of the clustering of regulatory changes in the middle of the 2000’s. Combining all 
three legal changes reduces annual growth in full service brokers by more than two percentage 
points a year, a result that is robust to yearly time dummies and alternative model specifications. 
 
Rest of the paper is presented as follows: in the next section, we provide a theoretical framework for 
statewide aggregation of firm-level costs. Section 3 provides detail on state laws and regulations 
influencing brokerage costs, with a focus on laws identified by the FTC-DOJ (2007) study. The 
                                                          
12 Some models adjust for pre-trends as suggested by Wolfers (2006). Results are robust to this adjustment. 
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empirical framework is presented in Section 4, which is followed by data and summary statistics. In 
section 6, we discuss the results. Some concluding remarks are made in section 7. 
 
A Model of Economic Costs at the Firm and State Level 
State level aggregation of local service industries has been found useful in many areas. Bates and 
Santerre (2013) aggregated costs from individual hospital and nursing facilities to the state level in 
order to use fixed effects to determine the effect of statewide economic indicators on costs.  
Johnson and Raphael (2009) aggregate individual AIDs cases that are transmitted locally to the state 
level. This allows them to use nested fixed effects models, and lagged variables, to evaluate the 
effects of incarceration on AIDS transmission by race, age, gender and year. Similarly, we propose to 
use lagged variables as part of our identification strategy. We conclude that aggregation is an issue 
primarily because of a long tradition of MSA level analysis of the brokerage industry. We begin our 
analysis with a firm-level model. 
 
Firm-level Analysis 
We study real economic costs of a typical transaction, not commission rates paid by buyers and 
sellers. For this reason, our model is based on the theoretical framework in HH. Let bkrSjt be the 
number of full service brokers per unit service (transactions or, we will argue, population) in firm j at 
time t.13  Brokers get paid a reservation wage specific to each firm, wjt, as in Benjamin et al. (2009). 
We model total cost as a multiple, tm , times variable costs: i.e., we assume all costs are variable or 
equivalently that firms operate at approximately the same average total cost regardless of scale (see 
                                                          
13 Our theory is developed for full service brokers. This distinguishes the type of agent referenced by HH from a 
transactions agent or fee-for-service provider. Theory is based on full service brokers charging a fixed commission. We 
expect that legal and regulatory changes promoting the unbundling brokerage services will reduce the number of full 
service brokers. 
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Zumpano et al., 1993 and Anderson et al., 2000). This assumption is not restrictive because we will 
specify our model in change form. 
 
The total cost (Cjt) of Sjt units of service in firm j at time t is:  
 
jt jt jt t jt tC S w hbkrS m                                                                                                            (2.1) 
 
where th is the hours worked per broker which changes over time as employees change their 
allocation between part-time and full-time work. Benjamin et al. (2009) present evidence that the 
supply elasticity of hours is about 0.21 for full-time workers (i.e., over 20 hours per week) and near 
zero for part-time workers. Since we lack data on th , we will assume that it is constant. Section 4 
shows that this positive supply elasticity implies that our estimates of response to house prices are 
conservative.  
 
We model economic costs per unit service jtc as a linear function of full service brokers per unit 
service: 
 
( )
jt
jt jt jt jt
jt t jt
C
c f bkrS
w m S
                                                                  (2.2) 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity is captured by jt ,  and fixed effects for jt  allows for labor market 
differences such as differences in opportunity costs of employment or in concentration of labor by 
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skill level. The function ()f  indicates that we will allow for endogeneity between number of brokers 
and service levels; it is a linear approximation. 
 
To aggregate, costs per unit service are averaged at the state level; there are Ni firms in state i:
14 
 
0
/ ( )
iN
jt i it it it it
j
c N c f bkrS  

                                                             (2.3) 
 
To keep the notation simple, equation (2.3) indicates averaging only by using the subscript i on the 
right hand side, i = 1, …, 51 states. For example, change in notation from 
jtc in equation (2.2) to itc
in equation (2.3) indicates that the cost variable has been averaged over all firms in the state. An 
important strength of equation (2.3) is that we can include firms in rural areas as part of the 
aggregation, whereas most empirical studies focus on firms within MSAs, or MSA level aggregation. 
The plausibility of modeling heterogeneity over time and space in wages and fixed costs with it it   
will be presented as part of our panel VAR model of changes in full service brokers. 
 
The statistical effects of aggregation are to cause some loss of efficiency in the estimation of 
equation (2.3), since there is presumably correlation across the Ni firms. However, this is offset by 
reduction in measurement error since random errors in each variable will tend to cancel out at the 
state level.15 The main empirical implication of equation (2.3) is that full service brokers per unit 
service can proxy for economic costs under the assumptions required for equation (2.1). When 
estimating (2.3), we must allow for the fact that some heterogeneity comes from including firms in 
                                                          
14 Following the literature summarized above, we assume that costs per unit service are roughly constant across firms. 
15 See Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) for a discussion of aggregation. 
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rural areas, and smaller MSAs, where market structure and therefore costs are likely to differ from 
large MSAs. In section 4, we will introduce variables and methods for dealing with it and it . 
 
State Laws and Regulation Influencing Real Estate Brokerage Costs 
Increasing use of web-based search tools and technology has changed the way some real estate 
consumers use brokerage services. The internet allows buyers to obtain substantial information 
about listings and transactions in the area where they may purchase, and they can obtain information 
on neighborhood characteristics.16 They can also obtain listing information from FSBO sites, 
Craiglist and similar services. When a buyer informed by the internet approaches a real estate agent, 
the amount of time required for the agent to match the buyer with a seller has been reduced.17 
 
Likewise, sellers can obtain internet information on transactions in their neighborhood so they can 
form their own opinion about a listing price and derive future price expectation. More importantly, 
sellers listing their property on the MLS obtain wide exposure through the internet, reducing the 
time and resources expended by the agent to match the seller with a buyer. Some sellers may have 
enough information to use the agent only to list the property on the MLS and/or to facilitate closing 
of the transaction, rather than requiring a full set of services such as open houses and print 
advertising.18 In response, limited service brokers and transactions facilitators have entered the 
market in states that allow them. 
 
                                                          
16 As pointed out by the FTC-DOJ (2007) report, listing information obtained from the internet (using the “IDX” 
database) is not as detailed or as current as information obtained from the MLS through a real estate agent. However, a 
buyer who uses the internet before approaching an agent is still well informed relative to one who does not use the 
internet. The FTC-DOJ study reports that a substantial portion of buyers were using the internet in 2006 (FTC-DOJ, p 
25). 
17 We use the term “agent” to reference the possibility that transactions brokers or fee-for-service providers substitute 
for full service brokers. 
18 Hendel et al. (2009) points out that certain segments of buyers and sellers (e.g., those with the time and resources to 
access the internet) may use technology to reduce the cost of their transactions. 
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The FTC-DOJ (2007) lists several reasons why agent productivity (sales per agent) might not reflect 
the real cost savings allowed by the internet. Some of these are institutional: the complexity of the 
real estate transaction; limited knowledge on the part of many buyers and sellers; restrictions 
imposed by the MLS; and the unwillingness of some brokers to cooperate with those unbundling 
services and charging lower fees. 
 
Another set of restrictions are imposed by state laws and regulation. Our focus on minimum 
services, non-agency and anti-rebate laws is based on the FTC-DOJ study which lists these as 
leading causes of “substantial consumer harm” (p2). The DOJ has lobbied state legislatures not to 
enact minimum service laws and has threatened litigation in states with anti-rebate laws. 
 
We hand-collected data on changes in minimum service, non-agency and anti-rebate laws and 
regulations during the period from 2000 through 2012, when these laws changed in many states. 
These law changes allow unbundling of brokerage services and therefore imply reduction in costs. 
Figure 1 summarizes the legal interventions. Appendix tables provide details for each state. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Waivable Minimum Services and Non-agency Changes 
Minimum service laws require brokers to perform specific duties for buyers and sellers. We define 
minimum services as statutory or regulatory requirements that a broker or transactions agent 
perform certain minimum brokerage undertakings for a real estate consumer.  These services 
typically include assisting the consumer by accepting delivery of and presenting offers, assisting in 
negotiating, and answering questions.  Some states only require that agents perform these services if 
they represent the client in an agency relationship; some states only require them in an exclusive 
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agency relationship.  Waivable minimum services are the same types of legal requirements, but with 
a provision in the law that the requirements are waivable by agreement and therefore not binding: 
see Appendix table A1. This is significant difference because the waivable laws appear to clarify 
common law brokerage expectations but allow a lower level to be provided. For example, 
Delaware’s 2006 change requires that agents be reasonably available to a client to accept offers, assist 
in negotiation and answer questions. However, the law allows the client to waive these duties. In 
effect, this abrogates the common law of agency, allowing unbundling of services.  
 
Nine states allow minimum service laws to be waived, reducing liability for failure to perform 
fiduciary duties; appendix table A1 contains details. All these provisions were enacted in the period 
from 2006 to 2008, allowing application of our DID methods. These changes provide a quasi-
natural experiment since they clearly enact reduction in legal liability related to unbundling of 
services. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average number of brokers – measured by NAR members – in the nine waivable 
states compared to states with no waivable provision and those with no change in law of any kind.19 
For the majority of the time frame of this study, the NAR explicitly advocated full service, 
traditional brokerage. As evidence, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ sued NAR in 2005, alleging 
that NAR policies and rules prevented their members from working with other brokers offering 
limited services and MLS-only listings. The suit was settled in 2008, with new NAR policies going 
into effect in 2009.20 NAR’s full service emphasis is still evident in 2014: NAR members must 
commit to a code of conduct with more than 30 different articles, including 10 specific ways they are 
                                                          
19 The no law change line excludes states that changed anti-rebate provisions. 
20 See http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/May/08-at-467.html (last accessed in October 2014). 
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to cooperate with other Realtors™21. It is unlikely that transactions brokers or facilitators will pay 
the additional fees required of NAR members.22  
 
Figure 2 suggests that waivable minimum services reduced the demand for full service brokers, as 
measured by NAR members. Our econometric models will determine the significance of this 
difference and control for endogeneity and other factors. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
States that allow non-agency relationships are similar to those with waivable minimum services in 
that fiduciary responsibilities do not necessarily apply. Twenty one states allow some form of non-
agency; Appendix table A2 contains details. However, only three of these states changed to non-
agency after 2000, too few for application of our DID identification strategy.  Both non-agency and 
waivable minimum services facilitate transactions agents, so we combine them into a single law 
change dummy variable with nonzero observations for 12 states.23 
 
Anti-rebate Laws 
FTC-DOJ study (2007) uses the term rebate to include various inducements to convince buyers and 
sellers to close a transaction: e.g., gift certificates as well as cash rebates (p15).  They point out that 
rebates are a powerful tool for price competition: “without rebates, if the buyer’s broker were simply 
                                                          
21 See http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/publications/2014/Policy/2014-Code-of-Ethics-and-Arbitration-
Manual.pdf  
22 A NAR convention, November 2014 in New Orleans emphasizes sessions unlikely to interest a transactions facilitator. 
The conference includes a number of technology sessions, but they are oriented towards closing the transaction, gaining 
face-to-face contact with a client and office management. See 
http://www.realtor.org/educsess.nsf/ProgramsbyDateAll?OpenForm (last accessed October 2014). 
23 We built an average of a 4.5 month lag into all our dummy variables. For example, if a law change was passed in 2005, 
typically taking effect in July or in October, our dummy variable was coded one in 2006 and subsequent years. 
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to reduce his or her commission, the savings would go the seller’s broker, not to the home buyer” 
(p. 15). 
 
The use of rebates to pass cost savings on to buyers and sellers informs our identification of changes 
in anti-rebate states: details for each state are provided in appendix table A3. For example, New 
Jersey has long-standing anti-rebate laws but in 2005 it changed its statutes to allow rebates to buyers 
only. Given the special importance of this type of rebate to real estate brokerage, we count the 2005 
change as a rescission. By way of contrast, Alaska, which also has anti-rebate laws pre-dating 2000, 
enacted legislation in 2012 allowing real estate agents to donate money to charities chosen by buyers 
or sellers. We did not deem this to facilitate transactions in the same way as rebates directly to the 
principals, so we did not count this as a revision. 
 
The overall conclusion from our state-level analysis of legal changes is that no states have enacted 
anti-rebate laws since 2000 and seven states have rescinded them.24 This provides a natural 
experiment for the DID methodology. After rescission, we expect the growth in full service brokers 
(as measured by NAR membership) to be less than before.  
 
Next, we discuss our empirical methodology. A major focus there is to address the endogeneity 
issue: we need to control for the fact that costs may drive law adoption rather than the other way 
around. Similarly, we will address the concern that some missing variable, correlated with costs, 
explains law adoption and rescission. 
 
 
                                                          
24 Montana enacted an anti-rebate law in 2007 and rescinded it in 2008. We did not include Montana as having an anti-
rebate law. But we did record it as having a rescission effective in 2009. I.e., the state clarified that rebates are allowed. 
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Empirical Framework 
Equation (2.3) says that the economic costs of brokerage services can be approximated by state level 
full service brokers per unit service, bkrSit, provided that observed and unobserved heterogeneity are 
correctly modeled by the last two terms in the equation. HH, Barwick and Pathak (2015), Hsieh and 
Moretti (2003) and Beck et al. (2012) provided substantial evidence for this approximation and for 
easy entry and exit in response to the changing conditions in the housing market and fixed 
commission rates. Their findings imply that wasteful non-price competition will be evidenced by the 
following: 
 When house prices increase, the number of full service brokers will increase because returns 
per transaction have increased; likewise, decreases in prices will lead to exit of brokers. 
 When transactions change, the number of full service brokers changes in the same direction 
because returns are directly proportional to transactions per broker. 
One can think of other variables that influence entry and exit. The VAR model of differences in full 
service brokers will deal with these concerns as discussed below. 
A key issue here is the length of lags required for brokers to adjust at the state level. Entry and exit 
may be easy, but it takes some time for brokers to respond to changes in house prices and/or 
number of transactions. We introduce lags into the empirical model: 
 
0 1 2 3it it s it s it s it itbkrS bkrS HPI Trans                                                           (4.1) 
 
Here, t-s represents a lag structure, HPI is a house price index in state i at time t, and Trans is the 
number of transactions. The last two terms model observed and unobserved heterogeneity as in 
equation (2.3). 
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Differences-in-differences and Dynamic Panel Models of Cost 
In specifying equations (4.1), we have explicitly assumed strict exogeneity between the 
regressors and the error term. This assumption of orthogonality in OLS is easily violated in a panel 
data framework due to an overriding presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the last two terms of 
equation (4.1). This is especially problematic when we are dealing with states (or geographic regions) 
with multitude of dissimilarities. Any well-specified model would still stand to have missed several 
attributes that are intrinsically associated with the variables included. The unobserved effects (both 
cross-sectional and temporal) can be specified in a two-way error component model:  
 
it i t                                                                                                                                    (4.2)  
 
where i denotes state-specific fixed effects and t  year-specific effects. The year effects remove any 
influence from the national business cycle. 
 
The standard procedure for removing unobserved heterogeneity is the Fixed Effect or LSDV (Least 
Squares Dummy Variable) specification which is equivalent to ‘de-meaning’ or ‘mean-differencing’ 
the variables across cross-sections and time-periods respectively. But this still leaves some 
correlation with the mean component of the error term. Here, we take time series differences at the 
state level in order to eliminate i , and to approximate stationarity in other variables:        
 1 1 2 3it it s it s it s t itbkrS bkrS HPI Trans                                                       (4.3) 
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Equation (4.3) will be recognized as a type of differences-in-differences model (see Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996).25 We expect positive signs on the autoregressive parameters, 1 . Transactions should 
be positively related because they measure service levels and any changes in NAR penetration. 
 
The 2 parameters are the coefficients of interest in equation (4.3) since they directly capture the 
relationship between house prices and costs. The dependent variable should be the change in total 
hours worked as in equation (2.1) but we do not have state level data over time on hours worked by 
full service real estate brokers. But, hours vary positively with bkrSit for the reasons given by Hsieh 
and Moretti (2003) and by Benjamin et al. (2009). The changes in excess returns that motivate entry 
or exit of brokers will likewise motivate changes in hours in the same direction. By a standard 
omitted variables argument, the 2 parameters will be conservative (downwardly biased) estimates of 
the response of costs to changes in house prices.26 For these reasons, we omit hours, but qualify 
interpretation of 2 accordingly. 
 
The differences-in-differences approach in equation (4.3) has a number of advantages, providing a 
useful baseline model. However, some econometric issues such as serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity and, most importantly, endogeneity are associated with estimating this model27. 
We use a panel VAR approach to deal with co-dependency of the variables: i.e., we recast equation 
(4.3) as: 
                                                          
25 DID follows because one difference is state demeaning and the second is differences over time. An additional feature 
of our model is the lagged dependent variable to control for dynamic feedbacks. 
26 Intuitively, change in total hours will have more variation than change in brokers, so the 
2 parameters would be 
greater if the dependent were total hours. The omitted variables argument follows by moving hours to the right hand 
side where it enters as an omitted variable with a negative sign. This sign, together with the positive correlation with 
change in house prices, implies that the parameter of interest is downwardly biased. A similar argument applies to 
relative wages since wages and hours are likely to be positively related. 
27 See Baltagi (2008) for an accessible, detailed discussion. 
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0 1it it s t itY Y D e                                                                                                            (4.4) 
where 
{ , , }it it it itY bkrS HPI Trans       and tD = year fixed effects.                                               (4.5) 
 Equations (4.4) and (4.5), the standard form of panel VAR, allow us to calculate robust standard 
errors. We are agnostic as to expected signs in the itHPI and itTrans equations because of our 
focus on the effect of law changes on itbkrS . 
 
Effect of Law on Cost 
The effects of laws and regulations (hereafter “law”) on the panel VAR are introduced with a 
series of law dummy variables and interaction terms: 
 
0 1 2 2it it s t t it it it s i itY Y D law law Y e                .                            (4.6) 
 
Here, itlaw is a vector of dummies equal to 1 if state i changed a specific type of law influencing 
costs at time t, otherwise zero; a 4.5 month lag is included since a law that changed in 2005 would 
not be fully effective until 2006 when we code the dummy as one. We introduce law as a dummy 
because law changes are a shock to the reduced form VAR. We allow any law change to shift the 
VAR system by state, identifying the law effect by comparing the system before the change to that 
after. The interaction term in equation (4.6) allows the law dummy to change the response to change 
in transactions or house prices. 
 
State fixed effects, i , that were differenced out of equations (4.3) and (4.4) have been added back in 
equation (4.6). This is because the lawit variables introduce another difference to the VAR system. 
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The state fixed effects in equation (4.6) hold constant any omitted second-differenced state-level 
variable that might shift the constant of the VAR system given by equation (4.4). This differencing 
aspect of equation (4.6) makes it a powerful way to control unobserved variables and endogeneity: 
see discussion below. 
 
Our interest focuses on equation (4.3) with the law variable: 
 
1 1 2 3 2 3it it s it s it s t t it it it s i itbkrS bkrS HPI Trans D law law Trans                                 
                                             (4.7) 
Here the change in law dummy is interacted with change in transactions; likewise it can be interacted 
with change in HPI.  
 
All of our law change dummies are coded so that a one indicates a change expected to promote 
unbundling of brokerage services. As discussed above, these changes are 1) allowing minimum 
services to be waive or allowing non-agency and 2) rescission of anti-rebate laws. A third law 
variable is a change allowing either one of these two. In all cases, we expect a law change to reduce 
change in full-service brokers as discussed above: 2 0  . 
 
One issue with equation (4.7) is whether some omitted variable drives change in house prices, 
transactions and full service brokers. Changes in technology, income, the population age distribution 
or preferences for rental vs. ownership might be influential, but these are likely to change slowly 
whereas our model is based on differences. Our model is based on the findings of previous 
literature, and we do not find previous discussion of other variables plausibly related in annual 
change form. Moreover, VAR is agnostic about theory, relying on own-lags, predictive correlations 
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and tests for the absence of correlations as a necessary condition for exogeneity. One of the 
strengths of VAR is that one might be surprised to find any significant coefficients other than the 
own-AR coefficients,  1  in equation (4.7). 
 
Pre-existing Trends as a Control for Endogeneity and Heterogeneity 
A further concern is existence of state-specific trends in the data, a source of time-varying 
endogeneity and heterogeneity. The sample of states that have these changes is unlikely to be 
random. Using an annual panel of states, Wolfers (2006) pointed out in the context of divorce laws 
that differences-in-differences estimates may confound the stock-flow dynamics with panel-specific 
trends. Specifically, in our context, the real estate brokerage laws are outcomes of intense regulatory 
debate and lobbying processes. Figure 3 demonstrates a possible effect of pre-existing trend on the 
estimates. The response to a legal change (rescission of anti-rebate laws are illustrated in Figure 3) 
would affect the number of full service brokers but the effect may be overstated if the trend is not 
accounted for as a counterfactual.28 Without an effective control for such pre-existing trends, the 
estimates may be systematically biased.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the way we used pre-existing trends at the state level as a counterfactual to 
adjust the number of full service brokers after a legal or regulatory change.29 We only include a linear 
trend as our model is already in changes. We expect that after controlling for pre-existing trends, we 
would find a consistent estimate of the legal changes. We introduce pre-existing trends as a 
robustness check on models that do not adjust for these trends.    
                                                          
28 Additionally, Figure 3 illustrates very different full service patterns by state over time.  
29 Waivable minimum service and non-agency changes were adjusted for pre-existing trends in the same way as 
rescission of anti-rebate laws. 
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Endogeneity of Law Changes 
In addition to the concern of pre-existing trends, a large number of political, institutional and 
regulatory features might facilitate the law changes we study. However, the issue here is whether the 
second difference for law changes in the VAR system (4.6) is influenced by endogeneity. Any 
attempt to argue that endogeneity is present would need to propose some mechanism whereby the 
VAR relationships feedback onto the law variables. 
 
To further control for possible endogeneity in law adoption, we use multiple lags for instruments in 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators and test for over-identification, as well as 
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel (DP) methods. We will implement a simpler two stage 
least squares model as a further robustness check on possible endogeneity of laws. These latter 
methods and tests will be introduced as additions to ordinary least squares estimation of the dynamic 
differences-in-differences model given by equation (4.7), with and without controlling for pre-
existing trends. 
 
Variable Specification and Data Description 
In our empirical analysis, we first test our VAR model with data over 1984-2012 for all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia. We then determine whether VAR parameters are robust when we 
limit the time period to 2000-2012 (663 observations) where we have data on law changes.  
 
The number of full service brokers as measured by membership in the National Association of 
Realtors (NAR) is the numerator of bkrSit.
30 We complete the VAR system (4.4) with volume of 
                                                          
30 An alternative source of information, number of licensees from the Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials 
(ARELLO) contains many discrepancies and recent information is missing for many states. After working with these 
data, we decided to focus on NAR brokers. 
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housing transactions from NAR and the purchase-only quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) by the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). We take the average year-over-year rate of change for the 
year. Data used for other variables are obtained from the US Census Bureau, and US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis with 
their definitions and sources.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Our system (4.6) has transactions as an explanatory variable in order to provide a flexible 
representation of the time series relationship between brokers and units of service as represented by 
transactions. We control changes in NAR’s share of total licensees by matching NAR brokers with 
NAR transactions.31 
 
Units of services provided by full service brokers are introduced with three definitions of our 
dependent variable, bkrSit: (1) number of NAR members, with services controlled by transactions on 
the right hand side; (2) number of NAR members per capita; (3) number of NAR members divided 
by total state income. A novel aspect of our empirical framework is the use of population and 
income to measure units of service. Those that do not transact at any given time still have a demand 
for real estate brokers because brokers provide liquidity to their homes. After 2007, many people 
wanted to sell their houses, but their reservation prices were above transactions prices, producing a 
pent-up desire to sell. The use of number of people or dollar income to measure service demand 
(i.e., in the denominator of brokers per unit service, bkrSit) is analogous to measuring birth rates per 
1000 women of child bearing age – as opposed to dividing by those actively trying to conceive. 
                                                          
31 We analyzed 20 states with time series information on NAR brokers and total number of licensees. The mean 
(median) percentage of licensees that are NAR members was 47.5% (47.6%) with a standard deviation of about 10%. 
The pattern of change over time in NAR membership percentages was remarkably uniform across the states, suggesting 
that the time dummies in our models will capture most variation in NAR membership penetration over time. 
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Results and Analysis 
Panel VAR Models (Table 2) 
Table 2 reports results for the entire 1984-2012 time period to test our VAR framework. We remove 
extreme values (only 6) of the dependent variable. All models are estimated with a GMM 
specification. The variables are de-meaned to remove state-level unobserved heterogeneity. Robust 
standard errors are used to obtain t-statistics. Three equations are reported under our three different 
brokerage service measures. 
 
We find strong support for the hypothesis that the cost of a given level of services is positively 
related to lagged house prices. The first-lagged house price growth is positive and statistically 
significant for all three measures of full service brokers per unit service. Moreover, the response of 
brokers to the first lagged house price change is also quite robust across the three specifications: 
elasticities range from 0.21 to 0.26. Overall, summing over two lags, we find the elasticities ranging 
from 0.18 to 0.22 for the broker equations. This provides the first confirmation of wasteful 
competition under the minimal assumptions required by VAR. This is a strong result given that we 
have differenced the data at the state level and controlled for autoregressive relationships within 
changes for full service brokers. Unsurprisingly, we find statistically significant and positive 
predictive power for transaction volume (models (1), (4) and (7)), as required in order to control for 
levels of services provided by NAR brokers and any change in NAR market penetration. The strong 
positive and robust relationship between the second lag in house prices and transactions volume, 
compared to the zero effect of the second lag on other variables in the system, suggests that house 
prices influence brokers before they influence transactions: i.e., the dynamics of wasteful 
competition are quite complex. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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We find that changes in full service brokers Granger cause changes in house prices and that the 
point estimate of the elasticity ranges from about .16 to .18 in the different specifications,  whereas 
transactions do not respond significantly to brokers in models (3) and (6). Also, the transactions 
variable positively predicts house prices with similar elasticities. The negative relationship between 
change in brokers per dollar income and change in transactions (Table 2, model 9), compared to 
insignificant relationships in models (3) and (6), suggest greater use of full service brokers when 
income increases, a finding new to this study. These results suggest that it is inadvisable to rely on 
assumptions of exogeneity among these three variables if using a structural model. 
 
State Fixed Effect Models (Tables 3 and 4a-4c) 
In table 3, we estimate the single equation model given by equation (4.3). We use state dummies to 
allow changes in the dependent to have different intercepts in each state. This tests the VAR for 
robustness and allows introduction of law dummies in the next table. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Transactions volume is a necessary variable as suggested by HH and our equation (4.3); also, it 
controls for any changes in NAR marketing not captured by the time dummies. This is confirmed by 
comparing table 3 regressions; the sum of coefficients on lagged changes in house prices is 0.07 in 
regression two as opposed to 0.25 in regression three and similar results are found when comparing 
regression five with six and eight with nine. The preferred specifications, which pair NAR brokers 
with transactions by those brokers, strongly confirm a positive relationship between number of 
brokers and transactions as suggested by free entry. 
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Compare Table 3, regression 3 with Table 2, regression 1. The coefficients on the house price 
variables are virtually identical and the transactions coefficients are both strongly significant and in 
the 0.15-0.27 range. We conclude that the state FE method closely approximates the full VAR 
system and that only one lag is needed. Similar conclusions are supported when we use brokers per 
capita and brokers per dollar income as the dependent variables. 
 
After testing that the basic hypothesis holds true with a long time series (1984-2012), we move on to 
testing regulatory interventions, where data are only available for 13 years (2000-2012). All 
regressions in Tables 4a-4c include a global financial crisis (GFC) dummy variable which equals one 
in 2007, 2008 and 2009, otherwise zero.32 The GFC dummy has the expected negative sign. 
Coefficients on first-lagged house price changes and transactions changes remain positive over the 
shorter time period. Reduced levels and significance for elasticity of brokers with respect to house 
prices in some models is likely due to the short time series, strong positive correlation with 
transactions (see Table 2) and downward bias due to the omission of hours worked. Interestingly, 
the better control for services in Table 4c increases significance levels for this elasticity, and the 
point estimates ( 0.15 to 0.18) are consistent with those in Table 3. We conclude that the model is 
generally robust to the short time series available to test law changes. 
[Insert Tables 4a-4c here] 
 
Changes to waivable minimum service and laws permissive of non-agency (Δlaw1) have significant 
negative effects, confirming the hypothesis that they encourage unbundling of services and reduce 
the costs associated with full service brokers. Pre-existing trends do not have an important influence 
on the effect of unbundling laws (results not shown). However the effect of waivable provisions and 
                                                          
32 Annual US real GDP peaked in 2007 and troughed in 2009. NBER business cycle dates are December 2007 (peak) – 
March 2009 (trough). Finally, Figure 2 shows 2007 as the first year of decline in brokers in most states. 
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non-agency changes is not robust to adding time dummy variables in any of Tables 4a-4c. Appendix 
tables A1 and A2 suggest that this is due to clustering in time: many of these changes occurred in 
2006. I.e., any effect of regulatory change on brokerage costs is captured by the time and GFC 
dummy variables in the short time series available. 
 
Rescission of anti-rebate laws and regulations (Δlaw2) have strong and significant negative effects on 
change in NAR members: rescission decreases the annual growth in full service brokers by more 
than 4.7% per year in all specifications with time fixed effects.  In preferred specifications (Table 4c), 
where services are measured by income and with pre-existing trends as the counterfactual, the effect 
rises to 6.0% per year. This is not surprising in light of Figure 3, which shows significant pre-existing 
trends in some states. It is not necessary to choose between these models in order to conclude that 
anti-rebate laws are important barriers to unbundling of brokerage services.  
 
Further evidence on the effect of time clustering is provided when all three legal and regulatory 
changes are combined in Δlaw3, a variable with changes in 18 states and in years ranging from 2005–
2010. The magnitude and significance of this coefficient is robust across alternative specifications of 
the model in the three tables. A law change reduces the growth of full service brokers by over 2 
percentage points per year.  
. 
Dynamic Panel Models (Table 5) 
The purpose of the dynamic panel models in Table 5 is to evaluate robustness to three key concerns 
discussed in sections 2 and 4: heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and endogeneity. As standard in 
the econometric literature, we present a range of models that differ in terms of number of lagged 
instruments and correction for heteroscedasticity, and perform one-step robust generalized method 
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of moments (GMM) estimation in first-differences. To test for serial correlation, we perform 
Arellano-Bond tests. Table 5 shows that the p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) tests. We reject the null 
hypothesis of no first-order auto-correlation for all models at the 5 percent significance level. The 
null hypothesis of no second order auto-correlation is not rejected for first two dependent variables. 
All five of these results confirm the model. For the third dependent variable (weighted by per capita 
income), we reject the null hypothesis.33  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments and thus a test of over-
identification is recommended. We perform the Hansen test that yields a J-statistic under the null 
hypothesis that instruments are exogenous. By default, the model uses all available lags as 
instruments. The results in Table 5 reassure our concern about endogeneity and serial correlation: 
the lagged dependent variables are important and significant inclusions in our models. The 
elasticities of brokers to first-lagged house price change are similar to Table 4 with time and state 
fixed effects. Most importantly, the sizes of the coefficients on the regulatory interventions are about 
the same as the estimates in Tables 4a-4c.34 This suggests that our conclusions from Table 4 are 
robust to additional testing for endogeneity, serial correlation and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Further Robustness Tests and MSA-level Regressions (Table 6) 
We conducted additional two stage least squares tests (not shown) designed to control for 
endogeneity. The first stage estimates which states are likely to adopt law change based on industry 
strength. The strength of industry influences on real estate boards is computed as number of 
                                                          
33 We included the inverse of lagged income in some models (not shown). This eliminated significance for AR(2) and 
results on the law variables are broadly similar to Table 5. 
34 None of the models we tested show significant interactions of law changes with any other variable. 
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industry members on the regulatory board.  The second stage is the same as the regressions in Table 
4, except that the law variables are replaced by values predicted in the first stage. Results confirm 
findings for the rebate and waivable variables.  
 
Furthermore, a key concern in all empirical modelling that we have conducted so far is that housing 
markets are essentially ‘local’: i.e. metro-level variation within a state is a significant source of 
heterogeneity. A significant challenge for us is that we do not have MSA-level data on number of 
brokers and transactions. Therefore, we respond to this concern with a regression-based partitioning 
of the state-level data to derive MSA-level information. Specifically, we use population (a demand 
shifter), building permits (a supply shifter) and the fixed effects to predict the state-level brokers and 
transaction information within a constrained regression where the coefficients of the demand and 
supply shifters sum to unity. Since we have the MSA-level data on the demand and supply shifters, 
we can then use the same coefficients and share of fixed effects to calculate the MSA-level 
information on number of brokers and transactions. Note that for multi-state MSAs, we apportion 
the variables according to the state shares.35 
 
With the derived information on number of brokers and transactions, we then perform exactly the 
same model specifications as in Tables 4 and 5: see results in Table 6, where we have 4,187 MSA 
years for the fixed effects model and 3,805 MSA years for the dynamic panel model where lags use 
the initial year. The results support wasteful competition; the coefficient on change in house prices is 
always positive and significant. The size of the coefficient is smaller than the state-level fixed effects 
model and about equal to the state dynamic panel model. We conclude that between 8% and 10% of 
                                                          
35 An appendix available on request contains details on each step: 1) the two state level constrained regressions on 
population and building permits (brokers and transactions are the dependent variables); 2) summary statistics for MSA 
level data on population, building permits and the derived information on brokers and transactions; 3) a list of multistate 
MSAs and the state shares used for allocating derived MSA data. 
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any increase in house prices results in wasteful increases in number of brokers on average across all 
MSAs. 
 
Turning to the law dummies, all coefficients are larger in absolute value and more significant at the 
MSA level. This confirms our earlier conclusion that we obtain conservative estimates of the effect 
of law change on the cost of brokerage services. For all 18 law changes, we now conclude that the 
changes resulted in an average 3.5 percentage points per year reduction in growth of full service 
brokers. 
 
The dynamic panel regressions in Table 6 indicate significant positive interactions between change in 
lagged transactions and the law dummies. It is plausible that more rapid growth in transactions 
would mute the effect of law change by encouraging full service brokers despite the less 
accommodating legal environment. The amount of this effect can be evaluated at the sample mean 
which is about +2.5% per year change in transactions; i.e., we multiply 2.5 times the interaction 
coefficient and add to the coefficient on the law change dummy. For Δlaw1 the net effect of the law 
change is -2.3% per year.  For Δlaw2 (Δlaw3) the net effect of the law change is -6.2% (-4.7%).  The 
Δlaw3 interaction has the smallest standard error and the net negative effect is still strongly negative 
(-2.4%) at the 75th percentile of transactions change (8.9% per year). Overall, Table 6 indicates that 
our approach to modelling the effect of legal changes is robust to MSA-level heterogeneity.  
 
Conclusions 
National Association of Realtor (NAR) brokers are a proxy for the cost of full services because 
brokers are typically 60-70% of operating costs and because NAR policies have catered to full 
service firms as indicated by the 2008 settlement of a suit brought by the DOJ. Consequently, we 
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approximate changes in full service costs with percentage changes in number of full service brokers. 
Starting with the structural cost model of Han and Hong (2011), we develop a reduced form model 
in an annual state-level panel vector autoregressive (VAR) system pairing number of NAR brokers 
with service levels as indicated by number of NAR transactions,  population and income. Changes in 
laws facilitating less than full services are introduced as quasi-natural events causing reductions in 
costs. We use differences-in-differences (DID), adjustment for pre-existing trends, dynamic panel 
models, and two stage least squares to control for endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and serial 
correlation.  
 
Our findings using data for 1984-2012 support the wasteful competition hypothesis of a positive 
relation between house price change and change in full service brokers after controlling for number 
of transactions: i.e., wasteful competition is confirmed when analyzed with VAR, DID and dynamic 
panel methods. Given that all variables are annual changes after subtracting state fixed effects, it is 
unlikely that some omitted variable (e.g., demographic changes) account for our findings.36 The 
predictions of the model are robust when cost per unit of service is specified as change in brokers 
per capita or as change in brokers per dollar income. 
Our main findings may be summarized as follows: 
 Using a dummy for the twelve states that changed to allow minimum services to be waived 
or non-agency to be substituted, we produce evidence that these changes, like the rescission 
of anti-rebate laws, tended to reduce the cost of brokerage services by encouraging 
unbundling. However, results are not robust to yearly time dummies because of the 
clustering of regulatory changes in the middle of the 2000’s. 
                                                          
36 Our results indicate complex dynamic interactions among brokers, house prices and transactions; these support the 
minimal assumptions required by our panel VAR framework. 
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 Results for the anti-rebate dummy confirm the findings of Han and Hong (2011): change in 
full service brokers per unit service responds negatively to rescission of an anti-rebate law. 
Our preferred estimates (Tables 5 and 6) suggest that rescission reduces growth of full 
service brokers by between 4 and 6 percentage points per year, on average across all states 
and MSAs. This result is robust to several alternative specifications and to various controls 
for endogeneity, including state-specific pre-existing trends.  
 Combining all law changes encouraging unbundling (eighteen states with changes taking 
effect from 2005 through 2010) indicates a strong negative effect on the number of full 
service brokers. The average effect is a reduction of more than 2 percentage points per year 
in growth of full service brokers and MSA-level regressions suggest net effects averaging 
between 3.5 and 5 percentage points per year. This is robust to annual time dummies and to 
several alternative specifications and econometric models. 
 
Our analysis provides a robust methodological framework of analyzing similar public policies. 
We develop a method for allocating state level variables to MSAs by using time series available at 
both levels with constrained regressions. With the derived information on number of brokers 
and transactions at the MSA level, results lend significant support to the state-level 
interpretations implying that the effect of legal changes is robust to MSA-level heterogeneity. 
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Appendix: Summary of Selected Law Changes in 50 States and District of Columbia 
Table A1: States with Waivable Minimum Service Laws 
State 
Non-
Agency? 
Waive 
Year Law Summary 
Delaware   2006 
revised 
in 2011 
2006: Delaware Code 
Title 24 §§ 2973, and 
2979; 2011 - now 
Delaware Code 2936 
2006 - common law of agency abrogated; unless not authorized (waivable), 
broker must be reasonably available to client to accept offers, assist in 
negotiating, and answer questions.  2011 -  law entirely rewritten, includes duty 
to cooperate with other brokers if client authorizes (waivable) 
Michigan pre-2000 2008 Michigan Compiled 
Laws § 2512d;  
Michigan 
Administrative Code, 
R 339.22307 
Statute requires a broker to accept and present offers, assist in negotiating, and 
furnish a closing statement; these services can be waived in a limited service 
agreement.  
Administrative regulation require that a licensee promptly deliver all offers and 
other documents, and shall make certain that all terms and  conditions of the 
real estate transaction are included in the offer to purchase. 
Statutes allow waiver; regulations do not. 
Montana pre-2000 2009 Montana Code 
Annotated § 37-51-
313 (12) 
1995 - Licensees must “endeavor to ascertain all pertinent facts concerning 
each property in any transaction in which the licensee acts” so the licensee can 
fulfill the his or her obligation to avoid error, exaggeration, misrepresentation, 
or concealment of pertinent facts; May 2009 - added waivable minimum 
services (participate in negotiations, obtains signatures on and submit offers),  
on offers, via Board Realty Regulation 24.210.641.     
Nevada   2007 NRS 645.254; 
Regulations T645-02 
In 2007, regulations defined duty to present offers as requiring minimum 
services, but statute enacted in same year making it waivable.  Requirement that 
presenting offers was defined as accepting and delivering offers and 
counteroffers, answering questions about offers and counteroffers, and 
assisting in negotiating.   
New 
Mexico 
pre-2000 2006 New Mexico 
Administrative Code 
16.61.19.8(D) 
Broker must present offers in a timely manner and assist with completing the 
transaction; these services can be waived; broker must disclose waiver to the 
other brokers involved in the transaction 
Ohio   2006 Ohio Revised Code 
Title XLVII 
§§4735.621, 4735.63, 
and 4735.65 
Licensees must accept and present offers, answer questions, assist in 
negotiating; these services can be waived.   
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Tennessee pre-2000 2006 Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 62-13-
404 
Unless specifically in writing (meaning waivable) a licensee must schedule 
property showings, receive offers, answer questions, and provide advice. 
Virginia   2006 Virginia Code §54.1-
2130 - 2134 
Prior to 2006 - requirement to present all written offers and counteroffers in a 
timely manner, even after the property is under contract; 2006 - minimum 
services required (assisting, presenting, negotiating) but can be waived if broker 
hired as independent contractor. 
Wisconsin   2006 Wisconsin Statute 
542.133(6) 
A broker providing brokerage services owes certain waivable duties, including a 
duty to negotiate on behalf of the client.   
Total  9   
Sources:  DOJ website, ARELLO, state statues and regulation, state public acts and bills, commission websites, media articles 
Notes: A review of the 51 state brokerage statues and regulations was conducted to determine whether a state had any provisions that could be 
interpreted as having a minimum service requirement that was subsequently modified to allow the requirement to be waived. We did not 
consider the requirement of timeliness to be sufficiently binding to be counted as a minimum service requirement. There are nine states that 
allow waivable minimum services as of December 2012. WAIVE gives the year the requirements became waivable and therefore not binding. 
NONAGENCY are states allow non-agency relationships; in all cases there was no change after 2000, which implies that the waivable provision 
further encouraged unbundling of services. See Table A2 for details on nonagency.  Sources: Media articles, state commission websites, state 
public acts and bills, state statutes and regulations, DOJ website and the Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials (ARELLO). 
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Table A2: States with Non-Agency Laws 
State Non-Agency 
Enacted 
Non-Agency 
Label 
Law Summary 
Alabama pre-2000 Contract Broker Alabama Code § 
34-27-81 (17) 
Real estate licensee assists one or more parties, who are 
customers, in a contemplated real estate transaction, without 
being the agent, fiduciary, or advocate of that party to the 
transaction. 
Colorado pre-2000 Transaction Broker Colorado Revised 
Statute § 12-61-802 
(6) 
In the absence of a signed agreement regarding the brokerage 
relationship, the default position under Colorado License Law is 
"transaction-brokerage". 
Florida pre-2000 Transaction Broker Florida Statute § 
475-278 (2) 
Presumed that all licensees are operating as transaction brokers 
unless a single agent or no brokerage relationship is established.  
A transaction broker provides a limited form of representation 
to a buyer, a seller, or both in a real estate transaction but does 
not represent either in a fiduciary capacity or as a single agent. 
Georgia pre-2000 Transaction Broker Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated 
Title 10, Chapter 
6A  
Broker who has not entered into a client relationship with any 
of the parties to a particular real estate transaction and who 
performs only ministerial acts on behalf of one or more of the 
parties. 
Idaho pre-2000 Nonagent Idaho Statutes § 54-
2083 (13) 
Broker working with or assisting a buyer or seller as a customer.  
Kansas pre-2000 Transaction Broker Kansas Statues 
Annotated § 58-
30,113 
A broker engaged as a transaction broker is not an agent for 
either party. 
Kentucky pre-2000 Transaction Broker 201 Kentucky 
Administrative 
Code 11:400 
Broker assists the parties to a potential real estate transaction in 
communication, interposition and negotiation, to reach an 
agreement among or between them, without acting as agent for 
any party; both parties are treated as customers.  
Maine 2005 Transaction Broker Maine Revised 
Statutes §13283 
Broker does not represent any party as a client to a real estate 
transaction 
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Massachusetts 2005 Facilitator 254 Code of 
Massachusetts 
Regulations 3.00 
(13)(e) 
Facilitator works to complete the transaction. Although bound 
by license law and MGL Ch. 93A, they do not have a fiduciary 
relationship with the seller or the buyer. They do not represent 
either party in the transaction. 
Michigan pre-2000 Transaction 
Coordinator  
Michigan Compiled 
Laws § 339.2517 
(11) (k) 
A licensee who is not acting as the agent of either the buyer or 
the seller. 
Missouri pre-2000 Transaction Broker Missouri Revised 
Statues § 339.755 
A real estate licensee may provide real estate service to any party 
in a prospective transaction without an agency or fiduciary 
relationship to one or more parties to the transaction 
Montana pre-2000 Statutory Broker Montana Code 
Annotated § 37-51-
102 and 313 
A licensee who assists one or more of the parties in a 
transaction, but does not represent any party as an agent. A 
licensee is presumed to be acting as a "statutory broker" unless 
they have entered into a listing agreement with the SELLER, a 
BUYER-broker agreement with the BUYER, or a dual agency 
agreement with all parties. 
New 
Hampshire 
2008 Facilitator New Hampshire 
Revised Statutes 
Annotated § 331-
A:25-f 
Licensee who assists one or more parties during all or a portion 
of a real estate transaction without being an agent or advocate 
for the interests of any party.  
New Jersey pre-2000 Transaction Broker New Jersey Statutes 
Annotated 45:15-1 
et seq.; Real Estate 
Commission 
Regulations 11:5-
6.9 
The New Jersey Real Estate License Law and the administrative 
rules promulgated thereunder do not mandate that licensees 
must act as agents when rendering real estate brokerage services.  
Transaction broker defined in state regulations. 
New Mexico pre-2000 Transaction Broker  New Mexico 
Administrative 
Code § 16.61.19.9 
A 
Broker that provides real estate services without entering into an 
agency relationship.  The transaction broker relationship is a 
non-fiduciary relationship. 
Oklahoma 2000 Transaction Broker Oklahoma Statutes 
§ 858-351, 858-33 
Broker who provides services by assisting a party in a 
transaction without being an advocate for the benefit of that 
party. 
Pennsylvania pre-2000 Transaction 
Licensee 
Pennsylvania Code 
§ 35.316 
A licensee who is not acting as an agent or advocate for the 
consumer. 
Page 39 of 53 
 
Rhode Island pre-2000 Transaction 
Facilitator 
Rhode Island 
General Laws 5-
20.6-2 (23) 
Does not owe any fiduciary duties to any party in a transaction.  
South Carolina         
South Dakota pre-2000 Transaction Broker South Dakota 
Codified Laws § 
36-21A-144 
Required to perform the terms of any written agreement made 
with the customer. 
Tennessee pre-2000 Facilitator/Transac
tion Broker 
Tennessee Code 
Annotated  § 62-
13-401 
Until an agent enters into a specific written agency agreement to 
establish an agency relationship with one or more parties to a 
real estate transaction, an agency relationship shall not be 
assumed, implied or created. 
Wyoming pre-2000 Intermediary Wyoming Statutes § 
33-28-305 
Does not act as an agent or advocate for either party. 
TOTAL 21       
Sources:  DOJ website, ARELLO, state statues and regulation, state public acts and bills, commission websites, media articles 
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Table A3: States with Anti-Rebate Laws and Rescission of Anti-Rebate Laws 
States, not listed here, never had an anti-rebate law 
State Anti-
Rebate 
Enacted 
Anti-
Rebate 
Rescinded 
Law Summary 
Alabama pre-2000   Alabama Code § 34-27-36(a)(11) &(12) Licensee may not pay or receive any rebate from any 
person in a real estate transaction. 
Alaska pre-2000   Alaska Statute §§ 08.88.401(d) & (e) Licensee may not pay any part of a fee to an unlicensed 
person, except paymets to client in resolution of a dispute.  
However, as of 2012, licensee may waive their commission 
if they are selling property of a charity or donate a portion 
of their commission to a charity.  For purposes of our 
analysis, we did not include Alaska as rescinding the anti-
rebate law because rebates still can not be given to buyers 
or sellers. 
Iowa pre-2000 2005 Iowa Code  § 543B.60A Prior to 2005, rebates were not allowed.  After 2005, 
rebates are allowed when there is only one broker involved 
in a transaction (not if there are two or more brokers 
involved in the same transaction). 
Kansas pre-2000   Kansas Statute Annotated §58-3062a3 Licensee cannot accept, give or charge any rebate or 
undisclosed commission. 
Kentucky pre-2000 2005 201 Ky. Admin. Reg. 11:011, Section 
1(5); 201 Ky. Admin. Reg. 11:121, 
Section 1(2) 
Regulations formerly prohibited a broker from offering any 
prize, money, free gift, rebate as an inducement.  These 
regulations were rescinded in 2005. 
Louisiana pre-2000   Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 145 
(7) 
Licensee cannot give a rebate.    
Mississippi pre-2000   Miss. Code Ann. § 73-35-21(1)(j)(2000) Licensee cannot pay any rebate, profit or commission to 
any person other than another state licensee.  
Missouri pre-2000   Missouri Revised Statute §§ 
339.100.2(13) 
Licensee cannot use prizes, money, or gifts as inducement 
to secure customers or clients. 
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Montana 2007 2008 Montana Board of Realty Regulation 
Rule 24.210.641(5)(af) 
The Montana Board adopted anti-rebate law in 2007, and 
reversed it in 2008.  Now, rebates are allowed and payment 
to any principals or reducing the commission owed by any 
principals is not considered payment of a commission to 
an unlicensed person.  For purposes of our analysis, we did 
not include Montana as an anti-rebate state because the 
anti-rebate law was not in effect long enough to allow for 
lagged entry and exit. 
New Jersey pre-2000 2010 http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/bulletins/
blt10_03.pdf 
As of 2010, broker can provide a rebate, but only to a 
purchaser of residential real property. 
New York       There is some commentator disagreement about how to 
interpret NY licensing laws; but commission website says 
rebates are allowed.  See 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/licensing/re_salesperson/re_sales
_broker_faq.html#18.  
North Dakota     North Dakota Century Code 43-23-11-
1.1 (l) 
North Dakota licensee cannot pay compensation or 
commission to any person who is not licensed; however 
the Real Estate Commission does not interpret this as 
precluding paying a rebate to a party to the transaction.  
Oklahoma pre-2000   Oklahoma Code, Title 59 § 858-312(21) Licensee cannot pay any part of a fee or commission to 
any person not licensed. 
Oregon pre-2000   Oregon Revised Statute § 696.290(1) Licensee cannot pay or rebate any part of the licensee's 
commission to any person who is not a licensee.  
South Carolina pre-2000 2006 South Carolina Code § 40-57-145(11) Licensee may pay a fee  to an unlicensed individual that is a 
party in the real estate transaction.  Our research did not 
uncover solid evidence of enactment date, and there was 
small possibility that the anti-rebate law was enacted in 
2004 - 2004 Act No. 218, Sections 20, 21. 
South Dakota pre-2000 2005 South Dakota Real Estate Commission 
Resolution 06-30-05-01 
1993 Declaratory Ruling prohibiting rebates was rescinded 
in 2005. 
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Tennessee pre-2000   Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-13-
302 
Licensee cannot give or pay cash rebates, cash gifts or cash 
prizes as part of real estate transaction.  the original anti-
rebate law was part of Tennessee Real Estate Commission 
Rule 1260-2-.33(2); the Commission was going to repeal 
rule, then in 2007 legislature enacted law prohibiting 
rebates. 
West Virginia pre-2000 2005 Legislative Rule - CSR §174-1-11.11.1 As of 2005, regulation was not enforced.  In 2006, 
regulation changed to allow gifts and rebates to clients and 
customers if terms are disclosed in writing. 
TOTAL 16 7     
Sources:  DOJ website, ARELLO, state statues and regulation, state public acts and bills, commission websites, media articles 
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TABLE 1a:  Summary Statistics, VAR and Panel Fixed Effects Models (1984-2012) 
Variable name & description Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
broker (Number of NAR members; National Association of Realtors (NAR)) 1,479 17,477 23,353 3,966 10,346 21,096 
cbkr = % Change in [broker] 1,422 1.50 8.26 -3.88 0.57 6.31 
cbkr = % Change in [broker/population] 1,422 0.52 8.05 -4.59 -0.22 5.17 
cbkr = % Change in [broker/(population*per capita income)] 1,422 -3.61 7.54 -8.61 -4.81 0.78 
popl (Number of population; Census Bureau) 1,479 5,389,693 6,003,661 1,332,213 3,668,976 6,306,019 
pci (Per capita income in $; Bureau of Economic Analysis) 1,479 27,169 10,485 18,605 25,807 34,412 
chpi (% Change in House Price Index; FHFA) 1,479 3.74 6.01 0.54 3.71 6.04 
trans (Number of transactions in '000s; National Association of Realtors) 1,171 94.06 101.34 26.1 62.6 116.8 
ctrans (% change in transactions) 1,119 2.48 11.17 -3.59 2.75 8.91 
 
 
TABLE 1b:  Summary Statistics, Law Change Dummy Variables,  2000-2012 
Variable name & description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Δlaw1 (Law change allowing transaction brokers ) - 12 states changed 663 0.113 0.316 
Δlaw2 (Rescission of anti-rebate) - 7 states changed 663 0.061 0.238 
Δlaw3 (All law change facilitating unbundling: ΔLaw1 and ΔLaw2 combined) 
- 18 states 
663 0.167 0.373 
 
Notes: Law change dummies are based on data presented in Appendix Tables A1-A3. All law change variables equal 0 before a change, 1 in the 
years following a change. Δlaw1 includes change to waivable minimum service (9 states) and to allow non-agency relationships (in 3 states).  Δlaw2 
includes rescission of anti-rebate laws in 7 states. Δlaw3 includes all changes promoting unbundling (18 states). In 2009, Montana passed rescission and 
also allowed waivable minimum services. It is counted only once in Δlaw3. Note that pre-trend adjustments are the same for both changes. 
We had complete broker data on 29 years in 51 states, or 1,428 changes from 1984-2012. We deleted 6 extreme outliers resulting in 1,422 observations. 
NAR transactions were available from 1989 except for two years in New Hampshire, resulting in 1,171 observations.  
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TABLE 2:  Basic Brokerage Cost Model without Regulatory Intervention: Panel VAR (1984-2012) 
 Change in [broker] Change in [broker/popl] Change in [broker/(popl*pci)] 
 Δbroker 
(1) 
Δhpi 
(2) 
Δtransactions 
(3) 
Δbroker 
(4) 
Δhpi 
(5) 
Δtransactions 
(6) 
Δbroker 
(7) 
Δhpi 
(8) 
Δtransactions 
(9) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.233*** 0.123*** -0.051 0.241*** 0.115*** -0.091 0.220*** 0.083*** -0.273*** 
 (4.45) (6.11) (-0.83) (4.60) (5.79) (-1.50) (4.59) (4.55) (-4.81) 
Δbroker_lag2 0.193*** 0.058*** -0.046 0.198*** 0.055*** -0.071 0.156*** 0.072*** -0.112* 
 (4.83) (3.21) (-0.75) (4.99) (3.17) (-1.16) (3.50) (3.99) (-1.91) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.227*** 0.581*** -0.259* 0.205** 0.591*** -0.222 0.262*** 0.634*** -0.161 
 (2.69) (10.77) (-1.82) (2.40) (10.93) (-1.57) (3.21) (11.54) (-1.18) 
Δhpi_lag2 -0.024 0.049 0.423*** -0.023 0.053 0.428*** -0.040 0.053 0.433*** 
 (-0.35) (1.15) (3.04) (-0.32) (1.25) (3.08) (-0.57) (1.22) (3.14) 
Δtransactions_lag1 0.267*** 0.086*** 0.449*** 0.257*** 0.088*** 0.451*** 0.214*** 0.094*** 0.464*** 
 (11.84) (6.91) (10.11) (11.68) (6.97) (10.11) (10.25) (7.26) (10.46) 
Δtransactions_lag2 -0.001 0.087*** -0.035 -0.007 0.090*** -0.026 -0.075*** 0.095*** -0.001 
 (-0.07) (7.98) (-0.85) (-0.35) (8.15) (-0.63) (-3.87) (8.71) (-0.02) 
Note: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used in computing t-statistics. The variables are 
de-meaned prior to VAR specification to control for the state-level unobserved heterogeneity and models are run with GMM procedure.  
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TABLE 3:  Basic Brokerage Cost Model without Regulatory Intervention: State Fixed Effects Framework (1984-2012) 
 
Change in [broker] Change in [broker/popl] Change in [broker/(popl*pci)] 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.343*** 0.144** -0.0161 0.337*** 0.119** -0.042 0.256*** 0.066 -0.049 
 
(5.62) (2.36) (-0.29) (5.61) (1.98) (-0.78) (5.37) (1.15) (-0.98) 
Δbroker_lag2 0.0792** 0.100*** 0.078** 0.083** 0.094*** 0.063* 0.041 0.040 0.008 
 
(2.23) (3.03) (2.06) (2.37) (2.84) (1.66) (1.17) (1.00) (0.20) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.342*** 0.240* 0.211** 0.321*** 0.216* 0.180** 0.328*** 0.176* 0.124* 
 
(2.94) (1.85) (2.33) (2.90) (1.76) (2.10) (3.46) (1.80) (1.89) 
Δhpi_lag2 -0.287*** -0.167* 0.0305 -0.279*** -0.155 0.0434 -0.216*** -0.081 0.102* 
 
(-3.03) (-1.66) (0.37) (-3.04) (-1.62) (0.54) (-2.79) (-1.10) (1.82) 
Δtransactions_lag1   0.146***   0.140***   0.123*** 
 
  (6.95)   (6.95)   (5.74) 
Δtransactions_lag2   0.026   0.024   0.028* 
 
  (1.27)   (1.33)   (1.81) 
Intercept  0.359* 1.369 -1.234 -0.170 1.213 -2.755** -3.241*** -2.622** -7.994*** 
 (1.93) (1.16) (-1.15) (-0.76) (1.08) (-2.49) (-8.34) (-2.54) (-6.99) 
Model 
Specification 
State FE 
 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State FE 
 
State & 
Time FE 
State & Time 
FE 
State FE 
 
State & 
Time FE 
State & Time 
FE 
R-sq 0.259 0.509 0.601 0.248 0.514 0.607 0.165 0.490 0.571 
N 1313 1313 1056 1313 1313 1056 1318 1318 1059 
Note: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used in computing t-statistics. 
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TABLE 4a:  Brokerage Cost Model with Regulatory Intervention: State Fixed Effects Framework (2000-2012) 
(Dependent variable: Change in [broker]) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.383*** 0.378*** 0.383*** 0.318*** 0.289*** 0.312*** 0.314*** 0.289*** 0.309*** 
 (8.33) (8.37) (8.40) (4.82) (5.63) (5.04) (4.72) (5.68) (4.85) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.241*** 0.261*** 0.232*** 0.065 0.093* 0.061 0.066 0.092* 0.062 
 (5.16) (5.59) (4.96) (1.11) (1.83) (1.05) (1.13) (1.82) (1.06) 
Δtransactions_lag1 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.176*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.116*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 
 (6.68) (6.87) (6.67) (6.11) (6.65) (6.15) (5.84) (6.56) (5.74) 
Law change allowing  -2.487***   0.111  
 
-0.052  
 transaction brokers (Δlaw1) (-3.78)   (0.12)  
 
(-0.05)  
 Rescission of Anti-rebate 
 
-2.695***   -4.781** 
  
-4.716** 
 (Δ Δlaw2) 
 
(-2.95)   (-2.48) 
  
(-2.64) 
 Law change allowing    -2.686***   -2.038*   -2.186* 
unbundling (Δlaw3)   (-4.72)   (-1.74)   (-1.86) 
Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw1       
 
-0.041  
       
 
(-1.01)  
 Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw2      
  
0.016 
       
  
(0.24) 
 Δtransactions_lag1*Δlaw3      
 
  -0.035 
      
 
  (-0.98) 
global financial crisis (GFC)  -5.715*** -5.855*** -5.574*** -2.477*** -2.630*** -2.498*** -2.476*** -2.618*** -2.517*** 
dummy=1 in 2007, 2008, 2009 (-12.34) (-12.14) (-12.10) (-5.67) (-5.87) (-5.92) (-5.96) (-5.81) (-6.17) 
Intercept 1.677*** 1.523*** 1.845*** -2.375*** -1.789*** -1.706*** -2.348*** -1.797*** -1.667*** 
 (8.99) (8.43) (9.21) (-6.58) (-4.54) (-3.83) (-6.48) (-4.69) (-3.74) 
Less pre-existing state-specific 
trend 
no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Model Specification State FE 
 
State FE 
 
State FE 
 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
R-sq 0.705 0.703 0.708 0.807 0.816 0.811 0.808 0.816 0.811 
N 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 
Note: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used in computing t-statistics. Adjustment of the 
dependent variables for pre-existing trends at the state level is intended to control for time varying- unobserved heterogeneity. Δlaw1 is a dummy for waivable minimum service 
and  non-agency.  Δlaw2 is rescission of anti-rebate laws. Δlaw3 is all changes promoting unbundling combined. 
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TABLE 4b:  Brokerage Cost Model with Regulatory Intervention: State Fixed Effects Framework (2000-2012) 
(Dependent variable: Change in [broker/population]) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.351*** 0.346*** 0.351*** 0.275*** 0.246*** 0.270*** 0.272*** 0.246*** 0.267*** 
 (8.27) (8.28) (8.31) (4.31) (4.98) (4.49) (4.23) (5.00) (4.34) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.255*** 0.275*** 0.247*** 0.081 0.107** 0.074 0.081 0.107** 0.075 
 (5.85) (6.36) (5.63) (1.51) (2.32) (1.39) (1.52) (2.31) (1.41) 
Δtransactions_lag1 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.181*** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 
 (7.18) (7.38) (7.17) (6.42) (6.97) (6.39) (5.80) (7.00) (5.87) 
Law change allowing  -2.361***   0.282  
 
0.140  
 transaction brokers (Δlaw1) (-3.95)   (0.35)  
 
(0.17)  
 Rescission of Anti-rebate 
 
-2.738***   -4.989** 
  
-5.002*** 
 (Δlaw2) 
 
(-3.04)   (-2.62) 
  
(-2.87) 
 Law change allowing    -2.619***   -2.009*   -2.153* 
unbundling (Δlaw3)   (-4.91)   (-1.78)   (-1.94) 
Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw1       
 
-0.035  
       
 
(-1.08)  
 Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw2      
  
-0.003 
       
  
(-0.04) 
 Δtransactions_lag1*Δlaw3      
 
  -0.034 
      
 
  (-1.14) 
global financial crisis (GFC)  -5.720*** -5.846*** -5.577*** -2.389*** -2.543*** -2.408*** -2.389*** -2.546*** -2.427*** 
dummy=1 in 2007, 2008, 2009 (-12.55) (-12.55) (-12.30) (-6.22) (-6.40) (-6.50) (-6.32) (-6.44) (-6.61) 
Intercept 1.070*** 0.931*** 1.241*** -3.169*** -2.549*** -2.475*** -3.145*** -2.547*** -2.437*** 
 (5.29) (4.64) (5.79) (-10.19) (-6.55) (-5.66) (-10.06) (-6.84) (-5.62) 
Less pre-existing state-specific 
trend 
no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Model Specification State FE 
 
State FE 
 
State FE 
 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
R-sq 0.684 0.683 0.687 0.793 0.802 0.796 0.793 0.802 0.797 
N 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 
 Note: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used in computing t-statistics. Adjustment of the 
dependent variables for pre-existing trends at the state level is intended to control for time varying- unobserved heterogeneity. Δlaw1 is a dummy for waivable minimum service 
and  non-agency.  Δlaw2 is rescission of anti-rebate laws. Δlaw3 is all changes promoting unbundling combined. 
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TABLE 4c:  Brokerage Cost Model with Regulatory Intervention: State Fixed Effects Framework (2000-2012) 
(Dependent variable: Change in [broker/(population*per capita income)]) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.130*** 0.142* 0.107* 0.137** 0.142* 0.107* 0.137** 
 (2.81) (2.83) (2.86) (1.95) (1.92) (2.02) (1.95) (1.93) (2.03) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.335*** 0.353*** 0.322*** 0.162*** 0.180*** 0.151*** 0.162*** 0.180*** 0.151*** 
 (8.40) (9.38) (8.16) (3.55) (4.56) (3.36) (3.53) (4.54) (3.35) 
Δtransactions_lag1 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.122*** 
 (7.28) (7.44) (7.27) (5.09) (5.44) (5.13) (4.31) (5.39) (4.27) 
Law change allowing  -2.538***   0.642  
 
0.683  
 transaction brokers (Δlaw1) (-3.84)   (0.87)  
 
(0.94)  
 Rescission of Anti-rebate 
 
-3.486***   -6.008*** 
  
-5.939*** 
 (Δ Δlaw2) 
 
(-3.72)   (-2.87) 
  
(-3.04) 
 Law change allowing   -3.061***   -2.228*  -2.166* 
unbundling (Δlaw3)   (-5.16)   (-1.81)   (-1.78) 
Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw1       
 
0.009  
       
 
(0.29)  
 Δtransactions_lag1*Δ Δlaw2      
  
0.017 
       
  
(0.20) 
 Δtransactions_lag1*Δlaw3      
 
 0.015 
      
 
  (0.48) 
global financial crisis (GFC)  -3.357*** -3.478*** -3.163*** -0.916** -1.100** -0.933** -0.916** -1.089** -0.925** 
dummy=1 in 2007, 2008, 2009 (-6.89) (-7.17) (-6.46) (-2.14) (-2.68) (-2.27) (-2.13) (-2.57) (-2.25) 
Intercept -2.609*** -2.738*** -2.372*** -6.168*** -5.476*** -5.341*** -6.174*** -5.485*** -5.358*** 
 (-8.49) (-9.48) (-7.40) (-18.03) (-13.07) (-9.21) (-18.08) (-13.41) (-9.34) 
Less pre-existing state-specific 
trend 
no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Model Specification State FE 
 
State FE 
 
State FE 
 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
State & 
Time FE 
R-sq 0.471 0.472 0.477 0.687 0.702 0.691 0.687 0.702 0.691 
N 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used in computing t-statistics. Adjustment of the 
dependent variables for pre-existing trends at the state level is intended to control for time varying- unobserved heterogeneity. Δlaw1 is a dummy for waivable minimum service 
and  non-agency.  Δlaw2 is rescission of anti-rebate laws. Δlaw3 is all changes promoting unbundling combined. 
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TABLE 5:  Brokerage Cost Model with Regulatory Intervention: Dynamic Panel Framework (2000-2012) 
 Change in [broker] Change in [broker/population] Change in [broker/(population*per 
capita income)] 
 (1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) (6) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.366*** 0.309*** 0.351*** 0.321*** 0.269*** 0.310*** 0.192*** 0.130*** 0.191*** 
 (6.16) (7.32) (6.78) (5.39) (6.55) (5.76) (2.95) (2.83) (3.24) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.068 0.106** 0.061 0.086* 0.121*** 0.076 0.145*** 0.171*** 0.124*** 
 (1.28) (2.29) (1.18) (1.77) (2.91) (1.59) (3.37) (4.66) (3.08) 
Δtransactions_lag1 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.104*** 
 (5.56) (7.39) (5.57) (5.30) (6.92) (5.36) (3.97) (5.42) (3.87) 
Law change allowing  0.420   0.430   1.500**   
transaction brokers (Δlaw1) (0.66)   (0.73)   (2.48)   
Rescission of Anti-rebate  -5.295***   -5.338***   -6.630***  
(Δ Δlaw2)  (-3.90)   (-4.05)   (-4.78)  
All law change allowing    -2.472**   -2.345**   -2.104** 
unbundling (Δlaw3)   (-2.36)   (-2.39)   (-1.98) 
Δtransactions_lag1*Δ Δlaw1  -0.029   -0.0244   0.022   
 (-0.83)   (-0.82)   (0.68)   
Δtransactions_lag1*Δ Δlaw2  -0.001   -0.007   -0.008  
  (-0.02)   (-0.10)   (-0.09)  
Δtransactions_lag1*Δlaw3   -0.029   -0.024   0.021 
   (-0.91)   (-0.83)   (0.63) 
global financial crisis (GFC)  -2.886*** -2.907*** -2.843*** -2.888*** -2.952*** -2.857*** -0.925** -1.133*** -0.895** 
dummy=1 in 2007, 2008, 2009 (-8.04) (-6.94) (-7.83) (-8.50) (-7.66) (-8.23) (-2.33) (-2.75) (-2.35) 
Less pre-existing state-specific  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
trend          
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences: p-value 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences: p-value 
0.106 
 
0.115 
 
0.105 
 
0.269 
 
0.330 
 
0.255 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions: p-value 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
N 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 
Note: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All models are estimated with one-step difference GMM with robust standard 
error specification to control for panel-specific auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. Δlaw1 is a dummy for waivable minimum service and non-agency.  Δlaw2 is rescission 
of anti-rebate laws. Δlaw3 is all changes promoting unbundling combined. 
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TABLE 6:  Brokerage Cost Model with Regulatory Intervention: MSA Fixed Effects Framework (2000-2012) 
(Dependent variable: Change in [broker]) comparable to Table 4a and 5 
 
 MSA Fixed Effect Models (Table 4a) MSA Dynamic Panel Models (Table 5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δbroker_lag1 0.549*** 0.551*** 0.540*** 0.590*** 0.600*** 0.578*** 
 (30.57) (30.66) (30.38) (26.99) (25.13) (25.98) 
Δhpi_lag1 0.096*** 0.103*** 0.097*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 
 (3.88) (4.13) (3.99) (2.97) (2.89) (3.10) 
Δtransactions_lag1 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (9.17) (8.20) (8.01) (7.86) (7.18) (7.10) 
Law change allowing  -2.989***   -3.211***  
 transaction brokers (Δlaw1) (-9.33)   (-4.14)  
 Rescission of Anti-rebate 
 
-4.082***   -9.329*** 
 (Δ Δlaw2) 
 
(-9.69)   (-4.89) 
 Law change allowing    -3.528***   -5.613*** 
unbundling (Δlaw3)   (-13.03)   (-6.92) 
Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw1  
 
  0.349***  
  
 
  (5.54)  
 Δtransactions_lag1* Δlaw2 
 
   1.229*** 
  
 
   (4.14) 
 Δtransactions_lag1*Δlaw3 
 
    0.357*** 
 
 
    (6.85) 
global financial crisis (GFC)  -7.151*** -7.219*** -7.033*** -6.832*** -6.054*** -6.273*** 
dummy=1 in 2007, 2008, 2009 (-33.52) (-34.07) (-32.85) (-32.89) (-24.30) (-29.79) 
Intercept 2.481*** 2.378*** 2.738*** 2.583*** 2.694*** 3.164*** 
 (22.73) (22.43) (24.53) (20.96) (18.29) (21.85) 
Model Specification MSA FE 
 
MSA FE 
 
MSA FE 
 
Dynamic 
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
R-sq 0.674 0.674 0.678    
N 4187 4187 4187 3805 3805 3805 
Note: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are used in computing t-statistics. Δlaw1 is a dummy for 
waivable minimum service and non-agency.  Δlaw2 is rescission of anti-rebate laws. Δlaw3 is all changes promoting unbundling combined. 
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FIGURE 1:  Regulatory Interventions in US Brokerage Industry 
Note: ‘Rebate’ indicates presence of anti-rebate law. ‘Waive’ indicates presence of waivable minimum service law.  
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FIGURE 2:  Response of Brokers to Waivable Minimum Service Laws 
 
Note: Index of average NAR brokers in states that changed to allow waivable minimum services during 2000-2012 vs. states that did not allow this and states with no 
law change of any kind.  
. 
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FIGURE 3:  Dynamic Response of Brokers to Rescission of Anti-Rebate Laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
 
KENTUCKY IOWA 
NEW JERSEY SOUTH CAROLINA 
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*Vertical line at specific years shows 
law rescission in each state. 
